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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE DOCTRINE OF DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
The Supreme Court decided two cases last term
which dealt with the scope of the government's
capacity to initiate or terminate successive prose-
cutions under the doctrine of dual sovereignty. In
United States v. Wheeler1 the Court held that Indian
tribes were separate sovereigns for purposes of the
dual sovereignty doctrine, such that successive
prosecutions in tribal and federal courts were not
violative of double jeopardy. And, in Rinaldi v.
United States,2 the Court held that failure to grant
a government motion to dismiss an indictment
brought in violation of the government's rule
against successive prosecutions amounted to an
abuse of judicial discretion. In both cases the doc-
trine of dual sovereignty was left undisturbed. In
the face of criticism directed at the doctrine by
scholars, and their doubts as to its continuing
validity, the Court's invocation of the doctrine
served more than to help decide the cases. It served
also to assure that the doctrine's vitality is unim-
paired.
I
In United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of dual sovereignty applies
to successive prosecutions in tribal and federal
courts, as well as in state and federal courts.3 As
formulated in Bartkus v. Illinois' and Abbate v. United
Statess the doctrine states that where two sovereigns,
each having an interest in the same subject'matter,
both make a particular act a crime, it is not a
violation of the fifth amendments prohibition
against double jeopardy if each sovereign prose-
cutes the act. No prohibition exists under such
circumstances, for the act is in fact "two offenses,
for each of which the defendant is justly punisha-
ble."
6
'435 US. 313 (1978).
2434 U.S. 22 (1977).
3 Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for a unani-
mous Court. Mr. Justice Brennan did not take part in
the consideration or decision of the case. -
4 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
5359 U.S. 187 (1959).
6 Moore v. Illinois, 55 US. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852).
This notion was strongly criticized in Note, 20 U. FLA_ L
In Wheeler, Anthony Robert Wheeler, a member
of the Navajo tribe, was convicted in the tribal
court for the Navajo Tribal Code offenses of dis-
orderly conduct and contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor.7 More than a year later he was
indicted for the federal offense of statutory rape,'
the federal indictment arising from the same con-
duct for which he had already been convicted by
the tribal court. Wheeler moved to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that contributing to the
delinquency of a minor is a lesser included offense
of statutory rape,9 and therefore a prosecution for
the federal offense would put him in jeopardy for
a second time.10 The district court dismissed the
indictment in an unreported decision, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed."
The court of appeals, pointing out that "the [Su-
preme] Court has construed its 'dual sovereignty'
rationale narrowly and has never applied it outside
the federal court and state court context,"' 2 said
that the relationship of the Indian tribes to the
Ray. 355 (1968):
This simplistic vici, of criminal law may operate
satisfactorily in a monarchy but it is totally inap-
posite in a federal system.... Crime is an offense
against society and not against a king or govern-
ment. The government prosecutes violations of the
criminal law, but that does not mean that the
government is injured by the commission of the
offense ... 7The only really acceptable view of crim-
inal prosecution in modern times is not punishment
for offenses against a sovereign, but offenses against
society. (Footnotes omitted).
7 NAVAJO TtnAL CODE § 17-351 (1959) (disorderly
conduct), and § 17-321 (1959) (contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor).
8 The federal offense in question is defined in 18 U.S.C.
§§1 153 and 2032 (1970).
9 The holding that contributing to the delinquency of
a minor was a lesser included offense in statutory rape
was not challenged by the government. 435 U.S. at 316,
nA
10 Such a holding, coupled with a finding that the tribe
was not a sovereign separate from the federal govern-
ment, would have blocked the second prosecution. See,
,g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
t United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.
1976).
12 rd. at 1257 (footnote omitted).
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federal government "does not fall neatly into either
the 'single sovereign' or 'dual sovereign' catego-
ries."
13
Although aware that the matter of tribal sover-
eignty was ambiguous, the court of appeals never-
theless found two pillars upon which to base its
holding that the tribes were not a separate sover-
eign for double jeopardy purposes. First, the court
looked to the Supreme Court's oft-quoted language
from United States v. Kagama.14 There, the Court
had noted that "[The tribes] were, and always have
been, regarded as having a semi-independent po-
sition when they preserved their tribal relations;
not as States, not as nations, but as a separate
people with the powers of regulating their internal
and social relations."' s Second, the court observed
that Congress "has complete and plenary control
over the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts., 16
Ultimately, the court decided that tribal sover-
eignty fell short of state sovereignty, such that
separate prosecutions by tribal and federal author-
ities based on the same conduct were impermissi-
ble.
1 7
In its reversal, the Supreme Court disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit in both its evaluations of tribal
sovereignty and its reliance on the fact that Con-
gress has complete control over Indian affairs. The
Court called the Indians' sovereignty a "retained
sovereignty,"' 8 that is, an inherent power of self-
government that predated the coming of Europe-
ans to America. The Court recognized, however,
that the Indians' sovereignty was one from which
certain prerogatives have been removed by treaty,
by statute, and by the tribes' incorporation into
the United States and attendant "acceptance of its
protection. ' 9
In answer to arguments that the tribes' depen-
dence on the United States precluded their being
separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes,
the Court looked to its decision in Worcester v.
Georgia.2 The Worcester Court had declared Indians
a domestic dependent nation and had noted that
"the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that
13/d.
14 118 U.S. 375 (1896).
15 Id. at 381-82.
16 545 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976).
17 After Wheeler was decided by the Ninth Circuit, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Wheeler, holding for its
part that such prosecutions were not barred. United
States v. Walking Crow, 560 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1976).
' 435 U.S. at 323.
19 Id.
2 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
a weaker power does not surrender its independ-
ence-its right of self-government, by associating
with a stronger and taking its protection.' Ac-
cepting the Worcester notions, the Wheeler Court
further acknowledged Indian sovereignty by citing
a Senate Report which had said that "their right
of self-government ... has never been
questioned. ' ' 2 The Court also opposed any sugges-
tion that Indian sovereignty had collapsed at some
point and then been partially revived. Instead, the
Court characterized diminutions in Indian sover-
eignty as having been made bit by bit, by purpose-
ful action of Congress-yet at no point obliterative
of the Indians' ever-present "retained sovereignty."
Thus, according to the Court, what measure of
sovereignty that has not been taken from the In-
dians still belongs to them.
From this standpoint, the absence of any dele-
gated sovereignty by Congress to the tribes by way
of statute or treaty23 is further evidence of Indians'
retained sovereignty. While the Court acknowl-
edged the existence of "implicit divestiture" of
sovereignty-that which follows necessarily from
the tribes' incorporation into the United States-it
pointed out that "[t]he areas in which such im-
plicit divestiture has been held to have occurred
are those involving the relations between an Indian
tribe and nonmembers of the tribe. ' Thus, find-
ing support for Indian sovereignty in the law of
nations and of the United States, and finding no
implicit or explicit divestiture of that sovereignty
relevant to the matter at hand, the Court found a
much greater sovereignty residing in the tribes than
had the lower court.
With its gaze fastened on the "primeval sover-
eignty ' of the Navajos, the Wheeler Court inti-
mated that the Ninth Circuit had erred in viewing
Congress' power to control completely Indian af-
fairs as determinative of the issue of tribal sover-
eignty. 26 While the Court believed that Congress
may divest the tribes of more of their sovereignty,
the fact that Congress had not yet done so meant
that the tribes still retained a measure of their
sovereignty. In this respect, the Supreme Court's
"past-oriented" theory of sovereignty, one that ac-"
21435 U.S. at 326 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
at 560-61 (1832)).
2 Id. at 325, n.23, (quoting S. Rep. No. 268, 41st Cong.
3d Sess., 10, (1870)).
' The relevant treaties and statutes can be found in
the NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE (1969).
2 435 U.S. at 326.




knowledged both the tribes' primeval sovereignty
and the diminutions of it, differed markedly from
that of the court of appeals, which had assessed
tribal sovereignty from the standpoint of only one
of a number of possible futures. And, from an
analytical standpoint, the Supreme Court's view is
preferable. The Court's position is more generous,
reserves more attributes of sovereignty to the infe-
rior governmental body, the tribe; and more cau-
tiously acknowledges diminutions of sovereignty
only where there is an historical event, such as a
treaty or a statute, to account for such diminution.
Aside from acknowledging the constitutional
principle that, as regards certain sovereigns, pros-
ecution by one sovereign cannot be barred by the
previous prosecution of another, the Court also
reiterated the practical rationale mentioned in ear-
lier cases, that barring the second prosecution
might frustrate a sovereign's interest in enforcing
its own laws.27 The Court demonstrated a deep
concern for tribal sovereign interests and an un-
willingness to see them melt away in the powerful
solvent of Congressional "plenary control." As the
Court noted, the "tribal courts are important
mechanisms for protecting significant tribal inter-
ests.' ' ss It is understandable, therefore, that the
Court did not read the federal statute as pre-empt-
ing the Navajo statute.
A holding that Indian tribes were sufficiently
independent as to admit of subsequent federal
prosecutions of those tried in Indian courts was not
reached without some trepidation on the part of
the Court. In Bartkus itself, the Court had written
that while successive prosecutions based on the
same conduct are a result of the dual sovereignty
of the states and the federal government, the result
is one with which the Court is "in little sympa-
thy.' ' 29 Yet the result in Wheeler was inescapable
unless the Court was prepared to overthrow either
the retained sovereignty of the Indians or the doc-
trine of dual sovereignty. The Court declined to
overthrow either.
While the prohibition of double jeopardy is well-
settled in the Western legal tradition,3° its precise
27 The argument was first made in Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), and was reiterated in Bartkus.
28 435 U.S. at 332.
2 With respect to successive prosecutions, the Court
said in Bartkus, 259 U.S. at 138, at the close of its opinion:
"The greatest of self-restraint is necessary when the fed-
eral system yields results with which a court is in little
sympathy."
3 See M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, 1969. The
prohibition is found among ancient Greek and Roman
writings.
meaning has varied from age to age, and at times
it has been wholly ignored3 ' The United States
Constitution forbids double jeopardys 2 and all fifty
states have a similar prohibition either in their
constitutions or in their common law.33 The pro-
hibition of double jeopardy is meant not only to
protect the accused from harassment by the sover-
eign, but also to ensure that judgments are final,
for if a new prosecution can be easily initiated, the
previous trial is thereby rendered ineffective.4
The problem of successive prosecutions by two
sovereigns was first discussed by the Supreme Court
in nineteenth century cases concerned with a
closely related issue-the power of both Congress
and the state legislatures to criminalize the same
conduct.s In none of these cases had successive
prosecutions actually taken place, but in all of
them the problem was discussed in dicta. Among
the Court members, there was general agreement
that inasmuch as the state and federal governments
constituted "dual sovereigns," neither a federal nor
a state prosecution could bar prosecution by the
other sovereign. At the same time, though, some
Justices expressed regret that the federal system left
open this possibility of successive prosecutions.
36
In 1922, the problem of successive prosecutions
was squarely presented to the Court in United States
v. Lanza.37 The defendant there filed a plea in bar
of his federal prosecution for violation of the Vol-
stead Act, stating that he had already been con-
victed of violating state statutes prohibiting the
same conduct. Rather than attack the doctrine of
31 See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEO.
Hisr. 283, (1963).
32 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. V.
'3 The five states which lack a prohibition of double
jeopardy in their constitutions have it in their common
law. They are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina and Vermont.
34 See Comment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 591, 598 (1961).
5 Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852);
United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850);
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). See also United States
v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. (No. 14, 445) (C.C.D.Va.) at 811,
where Justice Taney, in a circuit opinion, discussed the
question.
36Justice McLean, for example, dissented in Moore v.
Illinois, saying: "It is believed that no government, reg-
ulated by laws, punishes twice criminally the same act.
And I deeply regret that our government should be an
exception to a great principle of action, sanctioned by
humanity and justice." 55 U.S.'(14 How.) 13, 22 (Mc-
Lean, J., dissenting) (1852).
3 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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dual sovereignty, the defendant attempted to use
it to his advantage, claiming that since the eight-
eenth amendment clothed both "Congress and the
several states" with "concurrent powers to enforce"
the Act as both the state law and the federal law
derived their force from the same authority, such
that a second prosecution should be barred. The
Court, however, rejected the defendant's argument,
holding that the state law derived its authority
"not from this Amendment, but from the power
originally belonging to the states, preserved to them
by the Tenth Amendment. ' ' ss The Lanza Court
expressly refrained from ruling against dual sover-
eignty in its circumstances because the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy provision was not held
applicable to the states by fourteenth amendment
due process. But subsequently, in Bartkus and Ab-
bate, the Court held squarely that the federal and
state governments were separate sovereigns, such
that each could prosecute for all offenses against
its interests, even in the face of a prior prosecution
by the other.4°
In the meantime, there developed alongside the
Lanza-Bartkus-Abbate rulings another series of cases
holding that, for purposes of double jeopardy, nei-
ther courts-martial and territorial courts,4 nor fed-
eral and territorial courts, 42 nor municipal and
state courts4a could be considered arms of separate
sovereigns so as to permit successive prosecutions.
And, in the very early Nielsen v. Oregon," the Court
had stated in dictum that:
where an act is malun in se prohibited and punish-
able by the laws of both States, the one first acquir-
ing jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the
offense, and its judgment is a finality in both States,
so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of
the one cannot be prosecuted for the same offense
in the courts of the other.4"
In addition to these constitutionally mandated con-
33 U.S. CONsr. amend. XVIII.
39 260 U.S. at 382.
"°Justice Black dissented strongly in both cases, de-
scribing the Court's basis for its decision as "meager" and
the result as "shocking." 359 U.S. at 162 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
41 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
42 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302'U.S. 253 (1937).
43 Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
44212 U.S. 315 (1909).
45Id. at 320. The words "for the same offense" are
perhaps ill-chosen, for the Court has steadfastly held that
an act which offends two sovereigns is two offenses. This
appears to be true whether or not both can prosecute. See
note 6 and accompanying text supra.
straints upon a governmental entity's capacity to
pursue successive prosecutions, there arose, shortly
after Bartkus was decided, a self-imposed prosecu-
torial limitation on the federal government's pur-
suit of constitutionally permissible successive pros-
ed *ti6s. This limitation, known as the Petite policy,
instructed members of the Justice Department to
pursue successive prosecutions only where "the
need is compelling."'
46
After Bartkus and Abbate, certain Supreme Court
decisions gave rise to speculation that the Court
was eroding the rule of dual sovereignty, perhaps
even clearing the way for a reversal ofit.47 In Elkins
v. United States,48 the Court held that evidence
obtained by state officers during a search which, if
conducted by federal officers, would have violated
the defendant's fourth amendment immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures, was inadmis-
sible at a federal trial, despite the fact that no
federal officers had taken part in the search. Like-
wise, in Mapp v. Ohio49 evidence illegally obtained
by federal officers was held inadmissible in a state
trial. And, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,W° the
Court held that a grant of immunity by one juris-
diction did not give that jurisdiction the power to
compel a witness to give information that might
be used to convict him of a crime in another
jurisdiction.
The Elkins, Mapp, and Murphy cases presented
situations where state and federal authorities had
acted in concert to circumvent important consti-
tutional protections. Two separate sovereigns, nei-
ther of which was capable by itself of circumvent-
ing the particular constitutional safeguards, had
pooled their respective powers to nullify those safe-
guards. When the Court blocked this type of anti-
constitutional marriage of sovereigns, many observ-
ers, seeing a close resemblance to those cases in-
volving successive prosecutions based on a single
"The policy was announced in a Department of
Justice press release on April 6, 1959, shortly after the
decisions in Bartkus and Abbate, by then United States
Attorney General William Rogers. It said, in part,
"[a]fter a state prosecution there should be no Federal
trial for the same act or acts unless the reasons are
compelling." The name comes from Petite v. United
States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), where the policy was first
given recognition by the Supreme Court.
47See 46 IND. L.J. 413 (1971); 1 Loy. Cm. L. J. 98
(1970); 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 248 (1971); 39 U. CINN. L.
REv. 799 (1970); 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 355 (1968); 11 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 946 (1970).
48 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
49 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
50 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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act, believed that the Bartkus doctrine was being
eroded, for that too seemed an impermissible mar-
riage.5 1 And, when the Court in Benton v. Maryland,52
held that the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
guarantee should apply to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, this belief became more
substantial. Since a major part of the Court's jus-
tification for dual sovereignty in Lanza and Bartkus
had arisen from the inapplicability of double jeop-
ardy protections to the states, the Benton incorpo-
ration of the provision into the fourteenth amend-
ment was thought to have left the vitality of dual
sovereignty in question.
In addition to the supposed erosion of Bartkus by
the Court, several states had blunted the doctrine
by taking it upon themselves to enact statutes
51One court of appeals of Ohio came to the conclusion
in 1970 that "the rule in Bartk= is so enfeebled as to lack
all binding force." State v. Fletcher, 22 Ohio App. 2d 83,
259 N.E.2d 146 (1970). The Ohio Supreme Court re-
versed, however, with a sharp chastisement. As that Court
noted:
"Courts in this state are not expected to render
decisions on any shamanesque blending of peri-
phrasis, clairvoyance, speciosity, and anticipation as
to what the United States Supreme Court will
decide in fituro in a given factual situation.... If
the United States Supreme Court specifically over-
rules Bartkus on the dual-sovereignty concept enun-
ciated therein, then this court will follow such new
ruling in our decisions. Until then we will adhere to
Bartkur. Clearly Benton did not change the dual-
sovereignty principle of Bartkus." 26 Ohio St. 2d
221, 225, 271 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1971), et. denied,
404 U.S. 1024 (1972).
The federal courts, of course, did not deviate from the
holding in Bartkus. See United States v. Addington, 471
F.2d 560 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jackson, 470
F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973);
United States v. Barone, 467 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1972).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) gave rise to
a great deal of speculation that the doctrine of dual
sovereignty was coming to an end (see note 47, supra),
although it is difficult to see why. The usual line of
reasoning was that Benton, in holding that the double
jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment was appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
partially overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319
(1937), and since Palko was one of the bases on which
Bartkus rested, Benton thereby weakened Boter. But the
doctrine of dual sovereignty did not in any sense rest on
Palko. It rested on Lana, decided in 1922, and the nine-
teenth century cases already mentioned. It should be
noied in this regard that there was also law review
commentary arguing that Benton did not weaken a&rLr.
See Kimmelman, DoubleJeopardy: A Politkal Perspeatie, 5
CuM.-S/A. L Rv. 369 (1975) and 12 DuQ. L REv. 365
(1973).
52 395 U.S. 784 (1969). But see discussion in note 51
supra.
barring state prosecutions where a federal one had
already taken place.ss Therefore, when the Su-
preme Court accepted the Wheeler appeal, the time
seemed right for a re-examination, and perhaps a
reversal, of Bartkus."
The Supreme Court did not deal extensively
with the doctrine of dual sovereignty in Wheeler.
While the Court did explain the 'doctrine, its ra-
tionale and some of its history, the Court concen-
trated on applying the doctrine to a new situa-
tion--conviction by a tribal court-rather than on
defending the doctrine or seeking new justification
for it. The Court asserted the doctrine confidently,
not as one under review, but as one being well-
settled. Thus, the Court's decision was principled,
perhaps even predictable, for it was inevitable that
the two threads of Indian sovereignty and dual
sovereignty should one day meet. In Wheeler, the
Court wound them together without breaking
either.
II
The doctrine of dual sovereignty is an outgrowth
of the American federal system, and it has support
both in theory and in practice. But it is also
"unfortunate" and fails to win our complete sym-
pathy because we sympathize with the accused,
from whose standpoint two prosecutions for the
same act are still two prosecutions for the same act,
no matter how well justified.t 5 The Petite policy is
an outgrowth of that sympathy, a manifestation of
the benevolence described by Justice Daniel over
130 years ago in Foxav. Ohio.56 As Daniel had
claimed in Fox:
It is almost certain that, in the benignant spirit in
which the institutions both of the state and the
Federal systems are administered, an offender who
should have suffered the penalties denounced by the
one would not be subjected a second time to pun-
ishment by the other for acts essentially the same,
unless, indeed, this might occur in instances of
peculiar enormity, or where the public safety de--
manded extraordinary rigorYs
uee, eg., CAL. PEN.AL CoDE § 793 (West 1970); ILL
Aw. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. AN. § III (Purdon 1973).
" Clayton, Indianjurisdito and Related Double Jeopardy
Qye'tion, 17 S. DAx. L. R. 341 (1972) anticipated the
situation faced by the Court in Wheeler, and explained
the issues and opposing views thoroughly.
55 See note 6 supra for a strong criticism of the theory.
w49 US. (9 How.) 410 (1847).
57 Ld at 435.
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But the Bartkus/Petite-policy edifice is not flaw-
less, and it was out of a flaw in it that the situation
in Rinaldi v. United Statesas arose. In Rinaldi the
petitioner was convicted in a Florida state court for
conspiracy to rob a Miami hotel.59 While the ap-
peal from that conviction was pending, a prosecu-
tion was initiated in a federal district court for
crimes arising out of the same facts.' The peti-
tioner tendered a guilty plea to the federal prose-
cutor along with a suggestion that the prosecutor
request that any federal sentence run concurrently
with the state sentence. The trial attorney from the
Department ofJustice refused the offer and insisted
on a trial. When the district judge questioned the
attorney "about his refusal, he answered that he had
been instructed to proceed with the trial because
there was grave concern that the state conviction
would be overturned. The petitioner was convicted
in the federal trial,6' and the state conviction was
upheld in the state appellate court.
While the federal conviction was on appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
petitioner argued, and the government agreed, that
the Petite policy had been violated. The court of
appeals granted a motion to remand to the district
court to permit the prosecution to seek a dismissal
of the indictment pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'s But the
district court, using the discretionary power
granted it by Rule 48(a), refused to dismiss the
indictment,63 basing its refusal on the government's
bad timing (the motion came after the conviction),
and bad faith. The district court resented what it
perceived to be the government's manipulation of
the judicial system, that is, the government's strad-
dling of the Petite-policy fence-abiding by the
policy so long as state convictions were secure, but
abandoning it if they were not. The district court's
refusal to dismiss the indictment was affirmed by
58 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
59 The state offenses were conspiracy to commit rob-
bery, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and carrying
a concealed weapon. 434 U.S. at 23 n.2.
6 The federal offense was conspiracy to affect inter-
state commerce by robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). 434 U.S. at 23.
61 United States v. Washington, 390 F. Supp. 842,843,
(S.D. Fla. 1975).
62 FED. R. CGIM. PRO. 48 reads: "The Attorney General
or the United States attorney may by leave of court file
a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint
and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a
dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the
consent of the defendant."
6 United States v. Washington, 390 F. Supp. 842, 843
(S.D. Fla. 1975).
the Fifth Circuit." The majority, noting that the
government had conceded at oral argument that it
had violated its own policy, characterized the prob-
lem as a conflict "between the executive and judi-
cial branches as to each of their roles in a deter-
mination to dismiss under 48(a)."65 The dissent,
however, swayed by what it deemed to be good
faith (albeit late-blooming) on the part of the
government, favored the motion to dismiss.6
The Supreme Court, by and large, agreed with
the dissenters and reversed. As the Court stated,
"Our examination of the record has not disclosed
(and we will not presume) bad faith on the part of
the Government at the time it sought leave to dismiss
the indictment against petitioner."67 The Court did
not comment on the differences of opinion below
regarding the purpose of Rule 48(a), but chose
instead to shift the emphasis to the defendant and
the Petite policy. In connection therewith, the Court
pointed out both that the Petite policy was parallel
to the fundamental constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy, 68 and that it had a "lack
of sympathy" with the Bartkus result.s
Mr. Chief Justice Burger dissented without an
opinion. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined in his dis-
sent by Mr. Justice White, gave more attention to
the purpose of Rule 48(a). He wrote that the words
"by leave of court" were added to the rule to allow
for "an independent judicial assessment of the
public interest in dismissing the indictment., 70 He
was troubled by the prospect of a "new policy"
whereby the government might be empowered to
initiate federal prosecutions whenever it doubted
the security of state convictions, and drop those
prosecutions if state convictions later proved secure.
He felt that the issue needed full argument, and he
was no doubt right. Once the majority decided
that the government had acted in good faith, it
followed naturally that it would favor the motion
to dismiss. But if the government's plan from the
outset was to drop the prosecution if the state
conviction was affirmed, then the motion to dismiss
was not good faith at all, but part of a larger bad
faith. The problem will reappear, and continue to
nettle judges, who will feel they have been duped
by the government.
64 In re Washington, 531 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1976); In
re Washington, 544 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
6 544 F.2d at 209.
66Id. at 213.
67 434 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
Id. at 29.
6 See note 29 supra.




By pretermitting scholarly criticism of the doc-
trine of dual sovereignty and predictions of its
demise, the Court in Wheeler and Rinaldi under-
scored the doctrine's continuing strength as a the-
ory of federalism. Dual sovereignty is not soon to
be uprooted, but criticism of it will probably not
abate either, especially since such criticism went
unanswered in these two opinions. It is not clear
that federal, state, and tribal sovereignties cannot
abide harmoniously together in a federalism where
successive prosecutions based on the same conduct
are not permitted.
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